



No. TX 97-00119 No. TX 97-00131 No. TX 97-00150 (Consolidated)

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR THE PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF A STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT AND ORDER REGARDING NOTICE

(Assigned to the Hon. Mark W. Armstrong)

88386

The Plaintiffs hereby move this Court for its Order pursuant to Ariz. R. Civ. P. 7.1 and the due process clauses of the United States and Arizona Constitutions, preliminarily approving the Stipulation of Settlement (the "Settlement") dated April 19, 2006, which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". Upon preliminary approval of the Settlement, the Plaintiffs request that the Court enter an Order for such other findings and such other relief concerning the matter set forth in the "Proposed Preliminary Findings and Interim Order" which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B".

In that regard, as a result of the Settlement, and as a result of Plaintiffs' Counsels' separate Application For Award Of Attorneys' Fees, the Plaintiffs also request that the Court approve the Parties' stipulated Plan of Notice so that notice can be provided to the over 40,000 individual Claimants who may be common fund beneficiaries under the Settlement, affording them notice of the Settlement and the Claimants' rights to be heard and to object concerning the Settlement and Plaintiffs' Counsel's application for a fee award consistent with the provisions of the June 17, 1998 Judgment (The "1998 Judgment").

The preliminary approval of the Settlement contemplated hereby will be subject to a further and final hearing before the Court, which shall be for the purpose of making final such preliminary findings and making such other findings and granting such other relief, concerning such matters, as stated in the attached Proposed Preliminary Findings and Interim Order. The date of such final hearing shall be finally set at the hearing on this Motion, but the parties have agreed to schedule a date that is not less than 8 (eight) weeks after the Court preliminarily approves the Settlement.

To implement this process, it is contemplated that notice of the proposed Settlement, in all its particulars, shall be communicated to the Claimants specified in the Settlement, following the preliminary approval of the same by the Court, in the manner provided in the attached Proposed Preliminary Findings and Interim Order, or, in such other manner as the

88386 . 2

¹ For clarity and ease of reference, all defined terms referenced herein shall have the same meaning as set forth in the Settlement, Exhibit "A" hereto.

- 1 Court may establish at the hearing on this Motion.
- This Motion is supported by the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities,
- 3 the Declaration of Randall D. Wilkins, Esq. attached hereto, and by the Court's entire file
- 4 herein.

5

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

6 I. BACKGROUND OF THIS ACTION.

- 7 This refund action was commenced with the Arizona Department of Revenue (the
- 8 "Department") in 1989 and sought the recovery of Arizona income taxes paid by federal
- 9 employees on mandatory contributions to federal retirement programs.
- The procedural and substantive history of this case is the subject of seven published
- decisions, including one by this Court, 191 Ariz. 293, 955 P.2d 49 (Az. Tax Ct. 1998), five by
- the Court of Appeals, which are reported at 183 Ariz. 1, 899 P.2d 162 (App. 1994), 185 Ariz.
- 13 457, 916 P.2d 1173 (App. 1996); 197 Ariz. 213, 3 P.3d 1133 (App. 2000); 201 Ariz. 125, 32
- 14 P.3d 408 (App. 2001), 204 Ariz. 485, 65 P.3d 434 (App. 2003), and one by the Supreme Court
- 15 of Arizona, 207 Ariz. 181, 84 P.3d 446, cert. denied sub. nom. Moran v. Hibbs, 543 U.S. 810
- 16 (2004). The case is now back before this Court on remand from the Supreme Court of Arizona
- 17 to address Plaintiffs' claims that additional refunds are due Claimants for one or more of the
- 18 years 1985 to and including 1990. In this respect, currently pending before the Court is
- 19 Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce the June 17, 1998 Judgment concerning timely filed individual
- 20 refund Claims.
- This Motion has been stayed while the parties engaged in extensive settlement
- 22 negotiations. With the assistance of Mediator Bruce Meyerson, the parties have reached the
- 23 Settlement, which they believe benefits the Plaintiffs, the Claimants and the Department.

24 II. APPROVAL AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD.

- The Settlement represents a compromise of disputed Claims, including the pending
- 26 Motion to enforce the 1998 Judgment, which results in a monetary fund for the benefit of
- 27 Claimants who meet the eligibility requirements for a refund under the Settlement. In the
- 28 landmark case of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), the

United States Supreme Court established the constitutional requirements of notice that must be

2 satisfied by a trustee seeking judicial approval of a final settlement of accounts of beneficiaries

3 in a common trust fund. In Mullane, the Court ruled that an adjudication of a beneficiary's

rights must be "preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the

5 case," Id. at 313. The Court further observed that:

An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.

Id. at 314.

6

7

B

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Settlement in this case finally resolves all previously undecided issues in the case. These issues include reaching a compromise date on the issue of tolling and the pending Motion to enforce the 1998 Judgment. As a result of the Settlement, approximately 40,000 individual Claimants will have their Claims reviewed to determine if they are eligible for a further refund for tax years 1985 through 1990. In addition, under the Settlement, those Claimants who do not receive refunds, have preserved their existing rights (including their rights to appeal individually any adverse determination by the Department.)

In prior proceedings, it has been finally determined that the 1998 Judgment established that this Litigation is a common fund case and that the total refunds and interest paid by the Department constitute the common fund. Kerr v. Killian, 191 Ariz. 293, 955 P.2d 49 (Ariz. Tax Ct. 1998), aff'd, 197 Ariz. 213, 3 P.3d 1133 (App. 2000). Because the parties seek a final resolution of the beneficiaries' rights in the fund, the Settlement is subject to Mullane.²

III. LEGAL STANDARD — THE COURT SHOULD APPROVE A SETTLEMENT IF IT IS FAIR, REASONABLE, ADEQUATE AND IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CLASS.

In view of the due process requirements discussed above, Plaintiffs submit that the legal standard for approving settlements in class actions under Rule 23 by analogy is an appropriate guide for the Court in deciding this motion. The United States Supreme Court has

²This Court followed Midlane in ordering notice and a hearing in 1998.

- ruled that a state court proceeding applying a state statute which follows the notice procedures
- 2 for class actions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 satisfies Mullane's mandate for due process. See
- 3 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). The procedures agreed to by the parties
- 4 follow the due process procedures of Ariz. R. Civ. P. 23 and Mullane.

Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) provides that:

5

13

14

16

17

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in a manner as the court directs.

9 There does not appear to be a single published Arizona case interpreting this Rule. However,

O Arizona's version of Rule 23(e) is identical to the provisions of former Rule 23(e) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (and is substantially identical to the provisions of the current

federal rule), from which it was copied (formerly Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)). The State Bar

Committee Note to the 1966 Amendment to Rule 23 states "[t]he official comment of the

federal advisory committee on civil rules on the change in Federal Rule 23 is comprehensive

15 and should be consulted." Thus, federal cases interpreting Federal Rule 23(e) are helpful.

Rule 23(e) has been interpreted to require the trial court to determine whether a proposed settlement is fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable. Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). The determination of the fairness of a class action settlement is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that it "conducts a 'very limited' review and 'will reverse only upon a strong showing that the District Court's decision was a clear abuse of discretion." Linney v. Cellular Alaska P'ship, 151 F.3d 1234, 1238 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992)). "This is especially true in light of the strong judicial policy that favors settlements, particularly where complex class action litigation is concerned." Id.; see also Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191, 1196 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Federal Courts naturally favor the settlement of class action litigation."); Hispanics United of DuPage County v. Village of Addison. Ill., 988 F. Supp. 1130, 1149 (N.D. Ill. 1997) ("Compromise is particularly appropriate in complex class actions."). In determining whether a settlement, taken as a whole,

1 is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned, courts consider that "[p]arties represented by 2 competent counsel are better positioned than courts to produce a settlement that fairly reflects 3 each party's expected outcome in litigation." In re Pacific Enter. Sec. Litig., 47 F.3d 373, 378 4 (9th Cir. 1995).

In assessing a settlement proposal, a lower court must balance a number of factors to determine whether the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. "A number of factors [include]: the strength of the plaintiffs' case; the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining a class action status throughout the trial; the amount offered in settlement; the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; the experience and views of counsel; ... and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement." In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 458 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026 (citations omitted)).

Measured against these standards, the parties' Settlement is manifestly "fair," "ressonable" and "adequate" and should be approved.

IV. THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR, REASONABLE AND ADEQUATE AND IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CLASS.

The fairness and reasonableness of the proposed Settlement is conclusively established by the attached Declaration of Plaintiffs' Counsel, Randall D. Wilkins, attached hereto as Exhibit "C". The Declaration establishes that the Settlement, which provides for a procedure for the review and payment of eligible Claimants' Claims for individual refund claims filed before July 9, 1998, and which further provides for recognition of administrative appeal rights consistent with Arizona law for all Claimants who filed a Claim, will result in the refund to the Claimants who are eligible under the Settlement of virtually all of the illegal taxes together with the statutory interest. The Settlement should be preliminarily approved and notice should be sent to the Claimants. Following notice and an opportunity to be heard, the Court should enter a final order approving the Settlement.

1	V. CONCLUSION.		
2	For all the reasons set for	orth herei	n, Plaintiffs request that this Court grant their
3	Motions for Preliminary Approval and Notice.		
4	RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of April, 2006.		
5		BON	N & WILKINS, CHARTERED S.C.
6	6 O'NEIL, CA		EIL, CANNON, HOLLMAN, DEJONG S.C.
7			
8			Transall a Willi
9		By:	Randall D. Wilkins, Esq.
10			Paul V. Bonn, Esq.
11			Brian J. Campbell, Esq. D. Michael Hall, Esq.
12			Eugene O. Duffy, Esq. William A. Wiseman, Esq.
13			Plaintiffs' Counsel
14	ORIGINAL filed and copy hand-delivered this 19th day of April, 2006, to:		
15			
16	The Honorable Mark W. Armstrong MARICOPA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT N.E. Regional Court 18380 North 40 th Street		
17			
18			
19	Phoenix, Arizona 85032		
20	COPY of the foregoing mailed this 19th day of April, 2006, to:		
21			
22	William A. Richards, Esq. Senior Litigation Counsel		
23	Civil Division Office of the Attorney General		
24	1275 West Washington		
25	Phoenix, Arizona 85007-2926		
26	R. Dilain	1	
27	10.00000	-	
28			